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Intention and Structure in Contractual
Conditions: Outline of a Method
for Critical Legal Theory
Peter Gabel*
This essay criticizes the tendency of theorists to treat law as
an animated abstraction,as if legal rules and principles had a life
apart from their concrete appearance in temporal human consciousness. Instead, it suggests that law should be understood
as moments of interpretive activity, arising in concrete social
situations as an immediate modelling of social existence. This
modelling evokes a structured language that corresponds to
exigent relations of material production, yet struggles against
this structure towards an understanding that would resolve its
contradictions.

Most legal theory is conceived within the pose of reflective
scholarship. The theorist sits in his room, looks up at the
ceiling, and asks himself, "Hmm, what is law?" or something
like that. And he will find his answer precisely on the ceiling,
in the form of an ideal image, a "model" that he unwittingly
intends and then describes. Outside of time and history, the
abstraction assumes the composure of a thing, and, teleology
intact, it explains the world. For the positivist, sovereigns appear as if there really were sovereigns, engaging in "social
control" as if there really were a long arm of the law. His
fantasy is fashioned within an atomistic ontology which intends
to extirpate the social world, to present existence as a reified
fragment. For the naturalist the reification is horizontal; the
theme rather than the frame is made permanent, and the norm
puts on the impenetrability of nature. But in either case, the
vision gives to the law a substantial quality, a force that moves
objects in a world in which there can be nothing but objects, a
world that incarnates in mechanical form the drama of the
theorist's Idea.
So concealed is the original intention that structures the
orienting metaphor that what would seem obvious is decreed
invisible-namely that law is an instance or mode of interpreta* Professor of Law, New College of California School of Law, San
Francisco. B.A. Harvard, 1968; J.D. Harvard, 1972. Special thanks to
Alan Freeman, Duncan Kennedy, Tim Kliman-Simone, and Michael
Lerner for their critical reading of earlier drafts, and to Morton Horwitz
for his teaching.
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tion by consciousness. The realist cliche that "law is what
judges do" mistakes the behavior for the meaning within which
the behavior is lived, and it is this meaning, partially disclosed
by the interpretive structures which are denominated "legal,"
that ought to be the starting point for legal theory. If the
inquiry is not to be falsified at the outset, it must rid itself of
"objective" presuppositions that transform the lived project
which knows its meaning as contingency into an ideal form
within which meaning is hypostasized. Legal theory must avoid
producing fiction by transforming its phenomena into facts:
that is, its method must incorporate a critical phenomenology.
But the method must also be more than this, lest it fall back
upon the illusions of a pure and ahistorical subjectivism. Just as
the most persuasive modem phenomenology has acknowledged
that consciousness cannot fully penetrate in subjectivity the objective structures within which it is made known to itself,' so
legal theory cannot present its hermeneutic by the simple elaboration of a lucid intuition. It must begin by describing the field
of necessity within which consciousness is conditioned in order
to disclose the dialectical unity of the inert force of worked
matter on the one hand with the transcendant intention of the
legal idea on the other. A whole grasp of the legal moment
1.

Among many important books are P.

FOUGEYROLLAs, LE MARx(1959); H. LEFEHVRE, EVERYDAY LIFE IN TE MODERN
WORLD (1971); M. MERLEAU-PONTY, SENSE AND NoN-SENSE (1964); THE
STRucTURE OF BEHAVIOR (1963); THE PHENOMENOLOGY OF PERCEPTION

ISME EN QUESTION

(1962).
The work which has most influenced me is

3-P. SARTE,

LA RAISON DIALECTIQUE, THEORIE DES ENSEMBLES

PRACTIQUES

CRITIQUE DE
(1960).

A

translation in entirety has just appeared under the title CRITIQUE OF
DIALECTICAL REASON, THEORY OF PRACTICAL ENSEMBLES (1976) [hereinafter
cited as CRITIQUE]. I obtained a copy only as I was finishing the final
draft of this essay and so have made but limited use of it. The introduction to the French edition has been translated as J-P. SArRE, SEARCH
FOR A METHOD (1963) [hereinafter cited to the 1968 Vintage paperback
edition as SEARCH FOR A METHOD], and selections from the main body of
the work can be found in THE PHnosopHy OF JEAN-PAuL SART= 415-83
(R. Cumming ed. 1965). There are two summaries in English, W. DESAN,
THE MARXISM OF JEAN-PAUL SARTRE (1965), and R. LAIG & D. COOPER,
REASON Am VIOLENCE, A DECADE OF SARnzu's PnILoSOPHY, 1950-1960

(1964).
In addition, there are several excellent discussions of the book's contents. The most helpful to me were R. ARON, HISTORY AND THE DIALECTIC
OF VIOLENCE:

AN ANALYSIS OF SARTRe'S CRITIQUE DE LA RAISON DIA-

LECTIQUE (1975); F. JAMESON, MARXiSM AND FoRM, TWENTI-CENTURY

DIALECTICAL THEORIES OF LrrERATURE 206-305 (Princeton paperback, 1974);
and M. POSTER, EXISTENTIAL MARXISM IN PoSTwAR FRANCE: FRoM SARTRE
TO ALTHUSSER 264-305 (1975).
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cannot be forged from a mechanical materialism that speaks of
the law as merely a "form" "reflecting" the rigors of necessity,
nor from an intuitive apprehension sitting smugly outside of
history, ignoring the weight of its structured directional. It is
the intervalence toward which each movement in the theoretical
investigation must tend.
It is not an accident, of course, that a concrete dialectical
analysis of this sort is not usually attempted. Legal theory, like
the law about which it speaks, has an ideological function which
accounts for its form. We remain in an historical period, for
example, in which positivism is being surpassed by a new version of natural law,2 and so the battles of jurisprudence reflect
the constitutive tensions of this movement-tensions between
legal and moral obligation, between force and custom. On the
one side stand the cold-steelies, armed with formal rules prepared for formal deduction, ready to gun down the outlaw if
habitual obeisance should weaken; on the other lie the warmwoolies, willing to find normative principles, to channel and
protect expectations, to provide guideposts for the facilitation of
human interaction. From the vantage point of a critical methodology, we can penetrate the contours of this struggle and sketch
out its intentional ground, a ground that also serves as the base
for tensions in other spheres of ideology. It is, of course, not
mere coincidence that positivism and formal legal thought appear alongside empirical psychology and sociology during the
hey-day of a natural science method that freezes what it studies
into atomic facts, while natural law and functional legal thought
re-emerge alongside behaviorism and structure-functionalism
during the hegemony of a social science method that freezes
what it studies into process-facts. Our effort should be to make
intelligible this intentionality by which theory constitutes its
object in a certain way within particular historical conditions,
and in so doing to show the formal unity of the different levels
of ideology that work themselves out simultaneously-here at
the level of legal theory, at the level of explicit juridical acts, and
2. The orienting attitude of the modern positivist is reflected in,
for example, ILL.A. HART, THE CONCEPT OF LAW (1961), and H. KELSEN,
GENERAL THEORY OF LAW AND STATE (1949). That of the naturalist
is found in works as diverse, for example, as L. FULLER, Tim MORALITY
OF LAw (1964); J. RAwLs, A THEORY OF JUSTiCE (1967); and Dworkin,
The Model of Rules, 35 U. Ciii. L. Rnv. 14 (1967). There are many similarities in the opposing views; otherwise there could be no "constitutive
tensions."
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at the level of the implicit legal consciousness moving within the
whole of social discourse.
In attempting this preliminary work, I have taken a relatively small area of the law of contracts and used it to loosely
illustrate the operation of a dialectical method. Borrowing from
the later work of Jean-Paul Sartre, 3 I have used the term
"process" to refer to the impact of worked matter upon the legal
actors called to engage it, and the term "praxis" to refer to their
transcendant activity itself. By "transcendant" nothing mystical
is meant: the word "praxis" means a practicing consciousness
that interiorizes its phenomenal world as a conditioning and yet
surpasses it as a temporal project. On the "process" side I have
made use of certain structuralist concepts-notably the idea of
"signification" as descriptive of the relation between legal and
economic structures: here the effort has been to find a language adequate to describe the relation of law to the objective
conditions that overdetermine its form. 4 Discussions of "praxis"
3. See generally C~mQuE, supra note 1.
4. I am aware that sometimes the effort to find an adequate language has made the text quite difficult. At least part of the reason for
this is that we do not have an easy, shared vocabulary for describing
the ambiguity of lived experience. Ordinary language presents its world
from the outside, an orienting attitude that makes it difficult to speak
of interior meanings. So, for example, if we refer to "the mind" or "the
legal mind," we evoke an "it," a black box without spirit, a fact in a
fact-world rather than a being which projects a meaningful world. Still
there are some recurring words and phrases which may be unfamiliar
and which ought to be elaborated upon at the outset:
The, word "ontology" is usually said to mean "the study of being"
or perhaps in some contexts, "the nature of being." I prefer Heideger's
notion of a "making-manifest of being," M. HEMaGGE, BEING AwD TrMm
56 (1962), because it avoids the implication that being is a "thing" to
be studied or that it has a factual nature. In this essay the word
"ontological" means something like the same thing in relation to "being"
that "mental" ordinarily means in relation to "mind." If a phrase like
"the ontological dimension of legal discourse" seems obscure, one might
think of the relationship of law to mental activity in general.
In modern philosophy "phenomenology" is the description of being
as it appears to consciousness. Its effort has been to overcome subjectobject dichotomies by restricting itself to describing phenomena, including the phenomenon of consciousness, as they are revealed in the concrete, rather than abstracting entities like "subject" and "object" which
are then somehow meshed together. Thus a phenomenology of consciousness is a description of the being of consciousness as it reveals itself
to itself. On the phenomenology of interpretation, see text accompanying notes 38-56 infra.
Jacques Ehrmann defines "structure" as "a combination and relation
of formal elements which reveal their logical coherence within given objects of analysis." Ehrmann, Introduction to STnucTuAmism at ix, (J.
Ehrmann ed. 1970). One reservation that I have with this definition is
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frequently incorporate a phenomenological description in the
hope of elucidating the social and ontological meanings lived out
in legal activity. It will become apparent that I do not think one
chooses one or the other of these methods in the development of
theory, but rather that dialectical theory subsumes them both,
depending upon which "valence" of the legal moment one is
that it does not elucidate the relationship of the structured object to the
reason which forms it. If I speak of "the structure of material conditions" or "the structure of legal language," am I referring to an organized
matrix that somehow resides in the object of study, or am I organizing
the object to facilitate my project of comprehension? My own view is
that a structural analysis thematizes certain formal elements in a field,
that this thematization proceeds according to an a priori intuitive comprehension of processes unconscious to the actors who elaborate them
within the field of study, and that "the structure" is therefore found and
fashioned at the same time. It is a "making-visible" of the unconscious,
in the sense that the organizational coherence of the field is a human
organization that is not traceable in its structure to any human who produces it.
The idea of an unconscious also underlies my use of the phrases
"worked matter" and "the impact of worked matter" (though Sartre's
"inertia" conveys the sense more effectively than does the objectifying
word "impact"). *SummarizingSartre, Laing and Cooper write:
Matter, in and through man, is the motor of history, and constitutes a common future. As the stone gods, the tablets, the
relics of past objectified praxis, matter is the social memory of
a collectivity, a transcendent yet interior unity, a totality made
by a multiplicity of dispersed activities. It is the congealed
menace of the future (the stock-pile of bombs). It binds men
by providing the link between them, this link whereby in objectifying myself, I become another for the other.
LAING & COOPER, upra note 1, at 117. As a way of sensing the meaning
of this description, imagine a typical law school building with its classrooms, faculty offices, hallways, and so forth. This building is an arrangement of worked matter which gives rise to a social arrangement
of persons who must make use of it. Each person's possible activity
(praxis) is conditioned and restrained by each of the others, within the
collectivity linked by the building's organization. Thus students assembled in a large classroom, chairs facing front, are a faceless passivity
awaiting something, each superfluous to the other except as each is "of
the crowd." In a sense these human beings are a residue of the chairs.
Faculty offices make the faculty "nuclear": professors are "of the faculty" and yet isolated, members of a collection rather than a group. The
total social arrangement and each of its parcels are as much "of the
building" as are the bookshelves, the difference being that the bookshelves are lived by the faculty, students, office workers, and administrators as an interiorized past, For this building is not a "mere building"
or "naked thing" arranged in a certain way; it is a law school, an unconscious social memory whose historical structure illumines and dims the
possible future. Thus one might say that it is this "worked matter" that
carries an abstraction ("the law") through concrete law students and illumines their future as practicing lawyers.
As phenomena rather than facts, therefore, matter appears to labor
as a mediation of social relationships in a history-this desk on which
I write is understood by me toward its use, establishing my relationship
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trying to get hold of. What is offered is not a system or model
that explains, but rather a flux of intuition (on the phenomenological side) and analysis (on the structural side) that approximates a certain sort of lived experience.
When I say that I have "loosely" used an aspect of contract
law to illustrate an approach of this kind, I mean to emphasize
with its maker, at the same time that I use it toward establishing my
relationship with you. And the inertia of worked matter is discovered
in the social relations to which it gives rise. "The United States of
America" is made manifest in the signification of the flag, and the flag
is an inertia to the extent that we all stand around it, saying a pledge
of allegiance. For a fuller discussion in an accessible paperback, see
SEARCH FOR A METHOD, supra note 1, at 152-59. On the relation of worked
matter to law, see text accompanying notes 52-56 infra.
The interrelationship of "structure," "worked matter," and "unconscious" is an important one for this essay, although the idea of an unconscious receives only limited attention. Like the psychoanalyst who is
able to listen through symbols to an unconscious never directly revealed
in language, the structuralist sketches out forms according to her immanent knowledge of the field. This field is an inert arrangement called
out by worked matter and is unconscious to the actors who produce its
discourse. But as Sartre has said, a structure is not transcendant; for
the structuralist who makes of her method a philosophy, praxis is reduced to a deterministic process that does not transcend itself in action.
I am more persuaded that action is made only partly intelligible by a
structural analysis, and that an existential phenomenology remains essential for the intelligibility of human projects. This is because structures are not ontological objects; they are inertias in a temporal human
world. How else are they made comprehensible to the understanding
praxis of the structuralist who totalizes them as a field?
Finally, let me clarify what I mean by the phrase "temporal project,"
sometimes set against the phrase "atemporal object". The word "project" means "thrown-forward," and being thrown-forward describes the
activity of consciousness in the sense that consciousness always exists
in time, throwing itself forward meaningfully in its world. Therefore,
meanings can be said to have a "toward-structure," see text accompanying notes 41-44 infra; they are grounded in time and posit satisfaction
as a condition of the future. For a description of consciousness as
a projecting "for-itself," see J-P. SARTRE, BEING AND NOTHINGNESS

89-128 (Washington Square paperback ed. 1966) [hereinafter cited as
BEING Am NOTHINGNESS].

The word "ob-ject" has the literal meaning

of "thrown-against," suggesting that the word originally described a resistance to the thrown-forwardness of consciousness. The sense of
thrown-against is that in their very being "objects" have recourse to the
way they are experienced by consciousness in time. During the movement toward "empirical objectivity" in the sciences, however, this contingent character of the object was somewhere forgotten, producing the
peculiar assumption that the object had an independent reality apart
from its appearance. In this model the "real world" floats outside of
time, while we dismal subjects (thrown-unders) search for so-called
"hard data" in pursuit of "facts" which are "objectively true." Phenomenology is opposed to this reification of a "real world" that exists outside
of lived time, and this essay has really emerged from my discomfort with
theory that sees "the law" this way.
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that this has been a limited undertaking. Certainly my summary treatment of the recent history of the law of conditions is not
complete, and the paragraph or two devoted to political economy is but an outline of an outline. My intention has not been to
write a legal history or a political economy, but to take certain
received views which I believe have some validity and to suggest
a method for enlivening them, for returning what are now
human products to the realm of situated human action within
which they were created. Precisely because I believe that the
activity of legal interpretation overflows what is said or written
as "the law," I expect that these received views provide only the
partial truths of helpful and important researches.
If we are to move away from a prioris toward a synthetic
reconstruction of the ambiguity of concrete moments, our legal
theory cannot be "about" the way an entity called "the law" fits
into some larger entity called "society"; it must be a hermeneutic
that recovers the meaning of a particular sort of interpretation
by consciousness and gives back that meaning to reflection in a
more intelligible, explicit way.
I.

LEGAL BACKGROUND

The law of contractual conditions subsumes within its rubric rules relating both to the order of performance and to the
extent of performance required of each party.5 In other words,
once a valid contract has been formed, it is the law of conditions
that indicates which person must go first and how much the first
person must do before a duty of counterperformance matures.
Readers who are also lawyers may remember, for example, that
in a contract between A and B, if A must go first, then B's duty
to perform is subject to the "condition precedent" that A perform properly.
Ever since value has found its meaning in exchange, the
issue of "order of performance" has been resolved by indirect
reference to the credit risk. On January 1, A promises to sell
and B promises to buy a cow for a certain price, delivery to be
on June 1. Whereas in 1615, A could sue B on June 1 whether
or not she had tendered the cow,6 by the mid-nineteenth century
5. See 3A A. CoRBIN, CONTRACTS (1960 & Supp. 1971). External
conditions are omitted from my summary because not relevant. Also,
it is still possible for duties of performance to be independent, in which
case neither order nor extent of performance has anything to do with

"conditions."
6. See Nichols v. Raynbred, 80 Eng. Rep. 238 (K.B. 1615). Rules
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this solution would no longer correspond to normal assumptions
about what "the parties intended." Then and now the assumption would be that both parties must swap at the same time, in
the absence of some very clear indication that one intended to
give credit to the other. As long as B purchased the cow for use
in a local setting, the parties' duties were seen as independent of
each other; once the cow becomes a commodity, B's economic security demands that A tender delivery before B can be expected to pay. Each person's duty is conditioned on a tender by the
other. Similar sorts of perspectives, reflecting prevailing notions
about what people should reasonably expect, have influenced the
interpretation of employment and construction contracts, and so
forth.
But now let us suppose that A is to deliver ten cows a
month for a year. If she delivers only nine in June, is B to be
excused from any further duty in the remaining months of the
year because of "failure of condition?" Or has A done enough
to obligate B to continue living up to his side of the bargain, taking a deduction for any damage resulting from the missing
or delayed cow? If the law permitted B to cancel he might be
able to take advantage of a small and insignificant deviation
from exact performance by A in order to capitalize on a favorable turn of the market. A liberal observer would find such a
result unfair, since an innocent, trivial error by A would justify a
windfall gain to B at A's expense. On the other hand, allowing
A to perform only partially offends the conservative viewpoint
that the contracting parties know their own interests, that people
should be held to their bargains. If B dickered for ten cows in
June, he is to get ten, and if A delivers only nine, she must bear
the consequences.
It is an accepted view that legal history has seen a gradual
development from the first solution, requiring exact performance
of conditions, to the second, which concentrates on the materiality to B of A's breach. 7 In the late nineteenth century, toward
relating to the order of performance cannot be explained solely by the
credit-risk, but this seems to me a more helpful way to introduce the
problem to non-lawyers than would a plunge into the morass of independent and dependent covenants.
7. For a summary of this movement, see F. KESSLER & G. GILmoRCONTRACTS, CASES AND MATERIALs 812-911 (2d ed. 1970). Exact performance was not generally required in "skill and labor" contracts (buildings,
specially prepared goods) because it would justify uneconomic forfeitures. See, e.g., Beck & Pauli Lithographing Co. v. Colorado Milling &
Elevator Co., 52 F. 700 (8th Cir. 1892). Even in this area, however, courts
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the crest of capital accumulation and "freedom of contract," the
law aligned itself with the exigencies of laissez-faire economics.
The judicial function was restricted for the most part to realizing
the intentions of the parties as that intent was revealed in the
document; and so "ten cows" was ten cows and "courts will not
make contracts for the parties." With the advent of reform
around 1910, the judge began to evaluate agreements as an arbiter of fairness. B must not cancel now for minor imperfections in
A's performance; instead he must be solicitous of A's interest in
counterperformance. Only if the breach is "material" is B
entitled to treat his obligation as ended and sue for the full
damage occasioned by A's wrong. Otherwise, there is a continuing duty with a right of recoupment.
Two leading cases evidence this movement and offer a minitext against which to attempt an interpretation.
Norrington v. Wright,8 decided by the United States
Supreme Court in 1885, involved a contract in which the seller
had promised to ship iron rails in monthly installments of about
1000 tons. At the time of formation, iron was in short supply,
and the buyer hoped to make a killing from the seller's scavenging efforts in Europe. When there were shortages in the early
shipments, however, the buyer sought to cancel the contract,
no doubt because a decline in price permitted him to purchase
more cheaply at home or to forego the adventure altogether. The
light installments in themselves did not hurt the buyer, since he
could fill out each thousand tons in the market, benefitting from
the difference between the market and the contract prices. Nevertheless, the Court held the buyer entitled to cancel the entire
contract and refuse all remaining shipments:
In the contracts of merchants, time is of the essence....
A statement descriptive of the subject-matter, or of some material incident, such as the time or place of shipment, is ordinarily to be regarded as a warranty, in the sense in which that
term is used in insurance and maritime law, that is to say, a
of which
condition precedent upon the failure or nonperformance
the party aggrieved may repudiate the whole contract.9

And later, quoting from a supporting English case,
"It does not appear to me to be a question for your Lordships,
or for any court, to consider whether that is a contract which
bears upon the face of it some reason, some explanation why
it was made in that form, why the stipulation is made that the
would go a long way toward strict enforcement.
Brady, 17 N.Y. 173 (Ct. App. 1858).
8. 115 U.S. 188 (1885).
9. Id. at 203.

See, e.g., Smith v.
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shipment should be during these particular months. It is a
mercantile contract and merchants are not in the habit of placing
upon their contracts stipulations to which they do not attach
some importance.. . . If it be admitted that the literal meaning
would imply that the whole quantity be put on board during
a specified time, it is no answer to that literal meaning ... to
say that it puts an additional burden on the seller, without a
corresponding benefit to the purchaser; that is a matter of which
the seller and the purchaser are the best judges. Nor is it any
reason for saying that it would be a means by which purchasers,
without any real cause, would frequently obtain an excuse for
rejecting contracts where prices had dropped. The nonfulfillment of any term in any contract is a means by which a purchaser is able to get rid of the contract when prices have dropped; but that is no reason why a term which is found in a contract should not be fulfilled."'1o
The buyer's windfall is vindicated, and the seller is reprimanded
from between the lines for a helpful error. This is the absolute,
necessary deduction from failure of condition; because the condition of full performance did not occur the purchaser's duty to
pay did not arise.
Note the difference some twenty-five years later in the
language of Justice Cardozo of the New York Court of Appeals.
1
Helgar Corp. v. Warner's Features,Inc. involved a contract for
the sale of films. Plaintiff was to provide at least one per month,
defendant to pay by the footage within thirty days of the first
public showing, plus half the net profits from foreign sales. Certain films were delivered, for which payment was properly demanded on the day before Christmas, and not receiving said payment, the seller attempted to cancel the day after Christmas.
The claim was failure of condition relieving any further duty to
deliver and bolstering a suit not only for the price of the films
delivered but also for lost profits which the seller would have
received on the remainder of the contract.1 2 As in Norrington,
the delay was not serious-in fact, the seller may well have been

10. Id. at 208 (quoting Bowes v. Shand, 2 App. Cas. 455, 463-66
(1877) ).
11. 222 N.Y. 449, 119 N.E. 113 (Ct. App. 1918). From a legal-analytic
point of view, the comparison with Norrington is imperfect because Helgar is a late-payment case, and because Cardozo was guided by a statute,
Uniform Sales Act § 45 (2). But the case is used here as illustrative of
a movement in thought, and not as "analogous" in the strict analytic
sense. For an expression of the full development of this movement as
applied to defective deliveries like those in Norrington, see U.C.C. § 2612. This provision has abandoned not only the formal language of condition, but also the "intermediate" paradigm of entire and divisible contracts which could still be felt in its predecessor, Uniform Sales Act §
45(2) (1950).
12. 222 N.Y. at 452, 119 N.E. at 114.
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most interested in the percentage, which would not materialize
for some time. Still, buyer had broken the word, and seller cited
Norrington v. Wright, but the court said:
We have established a new test, which weighs the effect of
the default and adjusts the rigor of the remedy to the gravity of
the wrong. 'It depends in each case on the terms of the contract
the breach is 'so maand the circumstances of the case,' whether
terial' as to affect the contract as a whole.' 3
We have here a new structure, which evokes wholes and parts,
gravity and levity, right and wrong. The language has new oppositions, has acquired a different shape.
Default in respect of one installment, though falling short of repudiation, may under some conditions be so material that there
should be an end to the obligation to keep the contract alive.
Under other conditions, the default may be nothing but a technical omission to observe the letter of a promise.... General
statements abound that, at law, time is always of the essence
(... Norrington v. Wright...).

For some purposes this is still

true. The vendor who fails to receive payment of an installment
the very day that it is due may sue at once for the price. But
it does not follow that he may be equally precipitate in his
election to declare the contract at an end ....

That depends

upon the question whether the default is so substantial and tnportant as in truth and in fairness to defeat the essential purpose
of the parties ....

We must know the cause of the default, the

length of the delay, the needs of the vendor, and the expectations
of the vendee... .14

The court held that the plaintiff-seller was wrong to have cancelled, and limited his recovery to payments already due.
No one in the mid to late nineteenth century could know
about such matters as the "purpose," the "cause," "needs," "expectations," and so forth, or at least these interior phenomena

had no proper place in legal discourse. The non-fulfillment of
any contractual term had been a means by which a purchaser
could "get rid of" any contract, but now the innocent purchaser
must protect his partner, owes him a duty beyond that signified
by the objective written word, and indeed this was really his intention: as Cardozo observed elsewhere, "There will be no assumption of a purpose to visit venial faults with oppressive retribution."'15 It is of interest that not too long after Helgar, Fuller
and Perdue would publish The Reliance Interest in Contract
Damages,16 an article which would revise the paradigm of what
13. Id. at 453, 119 N.E. at 114.

14. Id. at 453-54, 119 N.E. at 114.

15. Jacobs & Youngs, Inc. v. Kent, 230 N.Y. 239, 242, 129 N.E. 889,
891 (1921).
16. Fuller & Perdue, The Reliance Interest in Contract Damages, 46
YALE L.J. 52 (1936). Almost twenty years is in some contexts a rather
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constitutes contract, breach, and injury in the direction of measuring the degree of reliance by the innocent party.
The movement from Norrington to Helgar, usually described as a development from a "harsh" to a "fair" rule, contains in its structure the transformation of the entire law of
contracts from its classical to its modern tort-like appearance.
With the help of some recent scholarship, 17 we can recognize in
the movement from a strict law of conditions to a law of material
breach all of the following related partial-restructurings in legal
consciousness:
1. From a form of thought in which contracts impose
absolute liability to one in which they impose a relative liability.
(There are no degrees of default in Norrington; there are in
Helgar.)
2. From a form of thought in which contracts are realized
in court as raising primarily "questions of law" to one in
which they are realized as raising "questions of fact." (The
Court in Norrington makes only a formal legal judgment about
the "surface" of the contract-either the condition has failed or
it hasn't. In Helgar a variety of factual judgments relating to
purpose, intent, wilfullness, and the like are left to the jury.)
3. From a form of thought in which a strictly defined
written word indicates the legal result to one in which a "found"
social norm (or perhaps "trade" norm) is used. (The Norrington Court looks at the "external" document to decide what was
the contract, while the Helgar court reaches inward to inquire
about reasonable expectations.)
4. From a form of thought in which the legal actors are
conceived to be "intending" only their own narrow self-interest
to one in which intention is circumscribed by, or really infused
with, "good faith." (The parties in Norrington were conceived
as intending to be able to get rid of their obligations in the event
of even trivial defaults, while the Helgar court will assume no
such purpose if the result would be unfair.)
long time. My point is that the Fuller and Perdue article realizes, at
the level of jurisprudence, a formal organization of "the facts" which
appears at the level of law in the earlier opinion.
17. A fuller discussion of some of these observations can be found
in G. GILmoRE, THE DEATH OF CONTRACT (1974), and in Kennedy, Form
and Substance in Private Law Adjudication, 89 HARv. L. Rnv. 1685
(1976). Kennedy expands upon the developmental account given here,
finding three overlapping periods (1800-1870, 1850-1940, 1900-present)
which he believes are phases of an enduring conflict in values between
what he calls individualism and altruism. Id. at 1725-37.
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5. From a form of thought in which reason proceeds
according to a formal logic, deducing result from rule (and following rules which permit this mode of reason in their structure)
to one in which reason has an a priori functional valence-that
is, in which an ideal social theme or "end-point" guides the
construction of literally "principled" decisions, inducing in a
loose sense "rule" from result. (The judges in Norrington
reason by simply identifying, in Hohfeldian fashion,18 the conditional duty, and then determining by formal logic that the
condition has failed. Cardozo reasons by reference to values
embodied by reasonable persons-that is, social values which
inform the "circumstances of the case"--and those values guide
the judge back to the legal result.)
Taken together, these movements in legal consciousness
make up what is usually called the decline of formalism, what
has even been called the "death of contract" in its classical
appearance.1 9 Each particular movement shares this universal: a separation in thought between law and morals has
given way to a form of thought in which the two are conflated.
The nineteenth-century legal mind knew the forum legi and the
forum conscientiae precisely as different "forums," as not belonging to the same genus. 20 The former contained objects in
18. The reference is to the analytic method proposed in Hohfeld,
Some Fundamental Legal Conceptions as Applied to Judicial Reasoning,
23 YALE L.J. 16, 28-59 (1913).
19. See GILMORE, supra note 17.

20. A very good statement of this bifocal position is given by counsel
in Laidlaw v. Organ, 15 U.S. (2 Wheat.) 178, 193 (1817) in defense of
a devious client:
The only real question in the cause is, whether the sale was invalid because the vendee did not communicate information
which he received precisely as the vendor might have got it had
he been equally diligent or equally fortunate? And, surely, on
this question there can be no doubt. Even if the vendor had
been entitled to the disclosure, he waived it by not insisting on
an answer to his question; and the silence of the vendee might
as well have been interpreted into an affirmative as a negative
answer. But, on principle, he was not bound to disclose. Even
admitting that his conduct was unlawful, in foro conscientiae,
does that prove that it was so in the civil forum? Human laws
are imperfect in this respect, and the sphere of morality is more
extensive than the limits of civil jurisdiction. The maxim of
caveat emptor could never have crept into the law, if the province of ethics had been co-extensive with it. There was, in the
present case, no circumvention or manoeuvre practised by the
vendee, unless rising earlier in the morning, and obtaining by
superior diligence and alertness that intelligence by which the
price of commodities was regulated, be such. It is a romantic
quality that is contended for on the other side.
See also Kennedy, supra note 17, at 1725, who places these remarks in
advance of the development of classical legal thought because they do
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an objective relation to one another which could be made known
by the neutral gaze of scientific logic; the latter contained a
profusion of subjectivity about which nothing objective could be
said, at least by lawyers. Twentieth-century legal discourse lets
both be known at once-in fact there is no "both." An objective norm presents the legal drama to the mind as already a
moral drama in which reason knows what is reasonable a priori.
All of this movement is, of course, "insubstantial" in the
sense that it reveals only the work of a certain sort of interpreting activity by consciousness. It is consciousness which invents
its categories of "law" and "morals" and, the systems of thought
which comprise each domain. Our effort is to interpret this
interpreting activity by unmasking its intentions. Although the
form legal reasoning takes in language is conditioned within a
structured economic process and cannot be "unmasked" phenomenologically, the intentions that find expression in this form
have an ontological meaning which I believe is disclosed in a
phenomenological investigation.

II. FORM: THE PROCESSED "SHAPE" OF LEGAL LANGUAGE
It has been held by some Marxists that the law is simply a

form through which the relations of production are "reflected"
in consciousness, 21 a point of view that has the weakness of
reducing praxis to process, relegating consciousness to the role
of a delta upon which necessity deposits its appearances. This
hyper-objective dialectic buries the lived situation of the legal
actor in an inertia which in an odd way contradicts certain other
images essential to a Marxist analysis-for example, the image
of "struggle."22 The modern integration of structuralism with
not yet separate the forums as a matter of ethics, but only as a matter
of pragmatic policy.

21. The reflection theory of consciousness is articulated by Stalin in

Dialectical and HistoricalMaterialism, in LENnsm: SELcTED WITIGs

406-33 (1942). Its mind-matter dualism gives rise to the rigid concepts
of "infrastructure" and "superstructure" often associated with Marxist
thought. For a Marxist analysis of law as ideology which suffers from
similar dualistic difficulties, see M. CoRNFoRTH, THE THEORY OF KNOWLEDGE 80-92 (New World paperback ed. 1971); see also the discussion of
legal concepts in 2 J.PLAMENATZ, MAN AND SocIETY 323-50 (1963).
22. Following Sartre, Jameson has remarked on this contradiction:
Every model has its limits and produces a type of distortion

characteristic of it; and it would seem clear that the classical
or orthodox Marxism we have been describing here (and developed not so much by Marx himself as by Engels and later writers), with its emphasis on the primacy of the economic, has the
disadvantage of drawing attention to the separation and rela-
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Marxism would seem to share this weakness to the extent that it
represents the activity of consciousness as mere "myth-making,"
the mere elaboration of signs that reveal in mythic design the
fundamental relations inherent in social structures. 23 Here also
tively autonomous development of each class, rather than to
their constant interaction in the form of class struggle. It is not
only, and not even, a question of determinism: for if one considers each of these theories as a model, the notion that the
economic factor is determinant seems less important than the
picture of the autonomous, somehow self-developing evolution
of each class which the parallelism with the economic evolution
suggests. The insistence on the primacy of the economic over
purely human agencies is a distortion not because it deprives
the individual human actor, or even the individual class, of its
freedom and efficacity, but rather because it abstracts from and
destroys the basic concrete form which human action takes in
history, namely the struggle between classes, and it is this which
most discussions of the role of human action in history leaves
out: that -on which men act, or in other words other men and
other classes. Sartre underlines this sharply in his discussion
of Engels' economism: "If the two classes are each in themselves the inert-or even the practico-inert-product of economic
development, if they have both equally been forged by the
transformations in the mode of production, the exploiting class
supporting its own statute in passivity, like a constitutional law,
and the powerlessness of the wealthy reflecting that of the
wretched, then struggle disappears: both serialities are purely
inert, the contradictions in the system reveal themselves through
them, that is to say, through each in a state of otherness to itself.
That kind of opposition between capitalists and wage-workers
does not deserve the name of struggle any more than does that
of the shutter to the wall it strikes against." (669).
JAmESON, supra note 1, at 292-93.
23. Whether the reductive tendencies of structuralism are a "weakness" depends upon how one responds to the continuing two-decade debate between phenomenologists and structuralists on the relationship of
consciousness to intelligibility. The structuralist movement identified
with the work of Levi-Strauss has denied the priority of consciousness
as strongly as the phenomenologists have affirmed it, seeking intelligibility instead through the relationship of linguistic signs to such structures as production and kinship arrangements. For Levi-Strauss, a person lives a life of mythical constructions which find their meaning outside of him in a structured arrangement of which he knows nothing.
Therefore, he believes "the ultimate goal of the human sciences to be
not to constitute, but to dissolve man," C. LEVI-SRAUSS, THE SAVAGE
Mnw 247 (Univ. of Chicago paperback ed. 1966), and he rebukes the
"transcendental humanism" he sees in a philosophy that places an ultimate comprehension within the totalizing consciousness (Sartre's praxis).
Id. at 262. In political thought this dispute has been recapitulated as
a struggle between structural and existential Marxism. The leading
writer on the integration of structuralism and Marixism is Louis Althusser, and the leading work is L. ALTHussm & E. BALmAR, READING
CAPiTAL (1970).

My own view is that an analytical reason that discovers the significance of action within structures (Levi-Strauss) simply does not address
itself to the interior intelligibility of the structure itself (Sartre) and yet
probably presupposes such an interior intelligibility. For scientific anal-
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there is no adequate description of struggle, of the engagement
by which the situation is brought to life and made meaningful to
experience. The judge sitting behind the bench, the lawyer
poring over his brief, the grade school teacher giving a lesson on
the constitution, the scholar who thinks up legal theory-all of
these people are concerned about making a living, about the role
they must maintain to do so, about freeing themselves from the
role which distorts their relationships; in short, they are wholly
involved in a meaningful way with the objective conditions that
alienate them at the same time they perform an objective function, spinning myths. This is to say that imbued in the uttered
sign evoked by a human voice is an interior relation to it, a
relation of meaning.
It is important, therefore, to show the activity of legal
interpretation in two dimensions-the dimension of form by
which law realizes objective processes in language, and the
dimension of praxis by which this interpretive activity is shot
through with a lived social meaning. I am well aware that to
put the problem this way is to retain a certain dualism, but this
seems to me a provisonal problem of method resulting from the
schizoid situation I am describing. It is not that there is a
metaphysical materiality which rumbles underneath while human beings struggle meaningfully on top, but rather that persons
are for the moment at a distance from the historical structures
which they mediate and create.2 4 Sartre has shown, as I will
ysis is not the outcome of a so-called "neutral gaze"; it emerges from
the comprehension of a theme-probably in the natural order (see note
40 infra), and certainly in the cultural order. As the structuralist observes a social organization, it is this comprehension that gives rise to
his sense of '"myth" (rather than, say, "discrepancy"), and it is this comprehension of "myth" that surpasses toward the unmythical. His analysis is not a neutrality but a totalizing praxis, and his analytical reason
is able to make out the signifier only by virtue of its dialectical dependence on the intelligibility of the signified. Thus phenomenology and
structuralism complement each other as movements of thought within
ontology, as situated social being seeks to make itself manifest. See also
the discussion of "structure" at note 4 supra. For what I take to be a
similar view, see PosTin, supra note 1, at 353 n.100.
For a review of the literature on the dispute between Sartre and
Levi-Strauss, see the references collected id. at 323 n.42.
24. "At a distance?" Roberto Unger concludes his recent struggles
against the antinomies of thought with the words "Speak, God." R.
UNGER, KNOWLEDGE AND PoLITics 295 (1975).
On the relation between
"structure," "worked matter," and "unconscious" see note 4 supra. See
also M. MERLEAu-PoNTY, TnE PHExOmENOLOGY or PERCETION 171 n.1
(1962), in which the author makes the following statement, with which

I am in agreement:
One can no more get rid of historical materialism than of
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describe in the next section of this essay, that in our history,
material conditions have given rise to social structures that appear as over and against us like an alien "outside;" and a praxis
that interiorizes relations which appear external to it as inert
structures (as "the facts of life") is living a situation which
becomes intelligible only through use of a dual method. This
situation does not have two levels, one "objective," the other
"subjective"; it is simply a whole situation which resists a monistic description. In order to situate the living legal actors who
worked out the development in the law of conditions from
"failure of condition" to "material breach," we begin with the
objective dimension I am calling the dimension of form-that is,
we begin with the revelation of an economic structure as a legal
structure.
During the period that serves as our text, I take as a
provisional given that something like the following transformation occurs in economic life. There is gradual movement from a
free-market capitalism, in which the accumulation of industrial
capital ncessitates an absolute and unregulated mobility of all
factors of production, to a monopoly capitalism in which horizontally and vertically integrated industries abandon chaotic competition in favor of more stable or "planned" interrelationships
among businesses, and between business and labor. This movement is brought about partly to maximize monopoly profits by
reducing competition, partly because the monopoly form generates a surplus that cannot be absorbed without a certain redistribution "downward" (a surplus that reveals itself in excess capacity and unemployment), and partly because the preservation of
psychoanalysis by impugning "reductionist" conceptions and
causal thought in the name of a descriptive and phenomenological method, for historical materialism is no more linked to such
"causal" formulations as may have been given than is psychoanalysis, and like the latter it could be expressed in another language. It consists just as much in making economics historical
as in making history economic. The economics on which it
bases history is not, as in classical economics, a closed cycle of
objective phenomena, but a correlation of productive forces and
forms of production, which is completed only when the former
emerge from their anonymity, become aware of themselves and
Historiare thus capable of imposing a form on the future....
cal materialism is not a causality exclusive to economics. One
is tempted to say that it does not base history and ways of thinking on production and ways of working, but more generally on
ways of existing and co-existing, on human relationships. It
does not bring the history of ideas down to economic history,
but replaces these ideas in the one history which they both express, and which is that of social existence.
(emphasis added).
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ideology under monopoly conditions necessitates a "reform."
Like the struggle among owners, the struggle between owners
and workers loses its "unregulated" character,.becoming a sort of
planned routinization of conflict with the eventual help of collective-bargaining agreements that structure long-term passivity
and collective work-functioning into the behavior of labor.
Within this movement, the state increasingly appears as a
participant-umpire, entering -the market to support demand for
both producer and consumer goods (through military and social
welfare expenditures) and facilitating the new cooperation
among productive factors as their mediator in the name of the
public interest. Free gives way to a linked, mass-bureaucratic,
25
and more public enterprise.
At first glance we can see a certain analogue to this transformation of economic life in the transformations of contract law
described earlier. The decline of formalism and the emergence
of "affirmative duties" have brought about what Kessler and
Gilmore call "a socialization of our theory of contract." 26 But
to comprehend these processes as a human history we must go
beyond mysterious analogues and parallelisms to a description of
a single structured process that at any given moment appears
from the outside as a totalization of effects that have a systematic
coherence. A dialectical comprehension requires infusing a
structural analysis with the meanings projected by a praxis or
practicing consciousness, but a structural analysis alone permits
us to see the totality from the outside.
From this analytical vantage-point, legal language functions as a "signifier," meaning that it makes visible by the use of
communicative signs the constitutive tensions in the economic
structure that organize laboring activity as a whole. These signs
are intentionally produced by a praxis, but their significance
depends upon the structure of actions which work back and
through this praxis as a process. Thus, for example, when we
25. Well-known works on the political economy of monopoly capital
are P. BARAN, THE PoLrIcAL EcoNoMY or GRowTH (1957); P. BARAN &
P. SWEEZY, MONOPOLY CAPITAL (1966); 2 E. MANDEL, MARXIST ECONONIIC
THEORY (1968); P. SwELzy, THE THEORY OF CAPITALIST DEopiENT
(1942). For interesting recent descriptions of the quality of labor under
modern conditions, see S. ARONOwiTz, FALSE PROInsEs: THE DEVELOPMENT OF WORKING-CLAsS

CoNscIousNEsS IN THE TWENTIETH CENTURY

(McGraw-Hill paperback ed. 1973)

(especially pp. 137-213), and H.

BRAVERMAN, LABOR AND MONOPOLY CAPrrAL; THE DEGRADATION OF WORK
IN THE TWENTIETH CENTURY (1974).

26.

KESSLER & GILMOR, supra note 7, at 1118.
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speak of later capitalism as a partly "planned" economy, we use
the word "planned" in an as-if sense, since no one "plans" the
structure although each of us intentionally produces its effects.
For the period that interests us here, we can characterize both
the formal coherence of the signifier (the law) and the formal
coherence of the signified (the organization of actions which are
abstracted as "the economy") by the use of what might be called
meta-terms that describe their organizing principle. In a "free
market" the structure of production engenders relations of labor
(here all forms of work) that are what I will call atomicsubstitutional, meaning that labor in production functions in
discrete, wholly competitive individual-units. In a "planned
economy" of the sort produced by the monopoly, relations of
work are structured as cluster-cooperative, meaning that labor
functions in less competitive group-units. If these relational
work-forms are to be signified and made visible, then language
must fashion itself according to coordinate principles of discourse-that is, its own organization must "be" atomic-substitutional or cluster-cooperative in the sense that it must allow a
reasoning capable of signifying atomic substitutional or clustercooperative effects.2
Now this talk about language "fashioning itself" may be
off-putting, but it is simply a necessary manner of speaking if we
are to be able to describe a structure whose form is not produced
by any individual social agent. Of course there is no "itself" in
a human world, but what we are trying to get hold of is a social
structure that works through an interpretive consciousness as a
sort of arranged inertia whose organizing principles are "outside" the interpreter. Phenomenologically, interpretive consciousness grasps the movement of relational work-forms from
atomic-substitutional to cluster-cooperative only by intentionally
27. Two points: first, there is no claim that other structures besides
the economic are irrelevant to legal discourse, but only that the economic
structure is dominant and mediates others. Thus the reference to "imperfect human laws" in the quote from an 1817 lawyer, note 20 supra,
calls upon religious ideas by implication, yet these will gradually
vanish under atomic-substitutional conditions which cannot tolerate
the ex-contractual religious bond. See Kennedy, supra note 17, at
1728. I have already borrowed Althusser's term "overdetermination"
as a way of suggesting this complexity. See L. Althusser, Structure
in Dominance: Contradictionand Overdetermination,in FoR MARX 20018 (Vintage paperback ed. 1970). Second, the terms "atomic-substitutional" and "cluster-cooperative' are provisional and oversimplified
metaphors for organizing principles toward which discourse tends. A
fuller study would certainly enrich and modify them, although any structural description will be de-centered by the overflow of praxis.
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reconstituting the way the world appears in reflection, but the
structural intelligibility of this world is, if you like, outside in the
world precisely as the price-system organizes the market in spite
of the real people who buy and sell.
Thus legal interpretation fashions itself according to a fusion of intention and structure which constitutes its way of
knowing its milieu, and the transformation of this interpretation
during the period which interests us conforms to the transformation of what it signifies., As the productive form of laborbehavior in the late nineteenth century is atomic-substitutional,
legal discourse must work within an gpist~me2 8-to borrow
Foucault's term-which allows consciousness to know "the parties" in precisely this relation. The form of reason that reveals
its object as atomistically constituted is the logic of natural
science-that is, a logic that knows what it interprets as an
objectivity without depth, an in-itself of external particles without immanent relation to one another. The significative intention of positivism as manifested in the legal discourse of the late
nineteenth century is therefore to make visible objective conditions that demand free substitution of discrete units in-so to
speak--"amoral" relation to one another. In the same vein, it is
only a normative gpist~me which is capable of revealing cooperative group-units, and so the logic of legal reasoning undergoes a modification of its structure: the particles which are
the object of its thought are given an "inside" and are bonded,
presenting a morally constituted world. "Natural law" as a
modern ideology is therefore the linguistic appearance of monopoly capital. The need for "assistance" among the factors of
production works back through the intentions of interpretive
activity and gives a new shape to the representation. The law
will now speak of a "duty to act in good faith," and nonfeasance,
formerly denoting an absence of obligation, becomes subsumed
within misfeasance.
When the Norrington Court is asked to interpret its event
concerning iron rails, therefore, it acts within the constraints of a
certain epistemological compulsion that gives a definite form to
the legal image. Otherwise free particles have established an
external relation or covalent bond; when this bond is broken the
particles are free once more. The Court asks itself certain
preliminary empirical questions (Have the conditions for bonding
28. See generally M. FOUCAULT, THE ORDEn or THINGs (1970). The
gpist~me is the hidden structure of knowledge that conditions discourse.
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been met? or Is there a contract?), moves through the empirical
logic dictated by the intended image to determine whether the
bond has been maintained (Has the condition for continued
bonding been met, or has it failed?), and deduces the legal
result, supported by certain principles of reasoning, such as
"Courts will not make contracts for the parties," the linguistic
form of which is also epistemologically compelled. 29 The oppositions in this paradigm-right and duty, contract and nocontract, breach and no-breach-cannot have degrees of existence because they are properties without quality, substantial
elements within a physical metaphor. Thus, "[the whole docThe Common Law's
trine of contract," Holmes would say in
30
famous footnote, "is formal and external.1

The behavior of labor works back differently through Cardozo's image: his particles have a social life a priori, an internal relation that gives qualitative shape to the external deal. The
structure of his discourse incorporates, as I have noted, degrees
of bond and degrees of breach, gravity and levity, right and
wrong-modes of immanence which require principles rather
than rules as the exigent form of interpretive reason. Because
the combinatory work-forms of monopoly capitalism necessitate
a certain "looking out for the other's interests," or what might be
called "moral behavior," the revelatory sign-structure gives a
normal expectation to the now un-free particle, a reason to rely
on faith as well as the word. To the jury is returned its premarket function of making law through an inherent grasp of the
facts, 31 an inherent grasp of the fusion of the factual "ought"
with the legal "is." In a well-known passage from an opinion
decided contemporaneously with Helgar, Cardozo would give
the new jurisprudence a lucid expression: "The law has outgrown its primitive stage of formalism when the precise word
was the sovereign talisman and every slip was fatal. It takes a
broader view today. A promise may be lacking and yet the whole
29. For example, "courts," "contracts," and "parties" are plural, general nouns-absolutely neutral abstractions in a world of atomic facts.
"Will (not) make" and "for" bring the abstractions to a directed life,
signifying action by "modelling" an atomic-substitutional effect (uncontracted parties free up). If there is any doubt about whether this linguistic form is compelled, imagine the judge of this period who insists,
"courts will make contracts for the parties," and who is then shipped
off to a sanitorium.
30. 0. HOLMES, TIE COMMON LAw 230 n.11 (M. Howe ed. 1963).
31. See Horwitz, Historical Foundationsof Modern ContractLaw, 87
HAiv. L. REv. 917, 925-26 (1974).
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writing may be 'instinct with an obligation,' imperfectly ex32
If that is so, there is a contract.1
pressed ....
Admittedly this is but a general sketch, but if there is validity to the suggestion that the formal function of law is merely
that of a signifying structure which moves within interpretive

consciousness, then certain of its claims to grandeur must be
bracketed and put aside. One such claim is that of the instrumentalist, who would make of the law a moving force that facilitates
the transformation of economic processes. 33 Instrumentalism retains an element of idealism in that while recognizing a connection between legal discourse and material conditions, it attributes
a causal influence to the former. During the phase of unregulated capital accumulation, for example, the instrumentalist's
entrepreneur required "formally realizable" 34 legal rules which
would assure predictability of legal outcome, and therefore classical contract doctrine developed its formal rules of offer and acceptance, its restrictive bargain-theory of consideration, its absolutist construction of the Statute of Frauds and parol evidence
rule, and its conservative attitude toward excuses for non-performance. Formalism would encourage investment by reducing
the risk of courtroom confusion ex post facto and by keeping false
statements from gullible juries.
The difficulty with the instrumentalist point of view is not
its focus upon the relationship between legal and economic
process, but its disintegration of the unity of legal and economic
process. Those who perform the signifying function of announcing the legal relations among economic actors do not stand
outside the directional and make useful rules, as if the law would
cause an effect which might otherwise be impeded. Rather, the
law is literally the effected voice of the relations of production; it
allows these relations to be seen. When a judge "decides" a
32. Wood v. Lucy, Lady Duff Gordon, 222 N.Y. 88, 91, 118 N.E. 214,
214 (1917).
33. For a description of instrumental rationality as an aspect of the
dominant social consciousness in the liberal state, see UNER, supra note
24, at 152-54.
34. "The extreme of formal realizability is a directive to an official
that requires him to respond to the presence together of each of a list
of easily distinguishable factual aspects of a situation by intervening in
a deterninate way." Kennedy, supra note 17, at 1687-88. Kennedy cites
Thering's example of the determination of capacity by sole reference
to age as an instance of a formally realizable definition of liability. In
contract law, an example is the "nirror-image rule," by which an acceptance, to be legally effective, must exactly match the terms of the offer
irrespective of the factual impression given to the offeror.
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lawsuit, she labors within an objective role of signifier, constituting an objectified image within which energized particles (or
"parties") move in a way made necessary by her reason, just as
her reason is made necessary by material conditions which
produce certain economic effects. Thus Hadley v. Baxendae 35
is not explained by the need for its rule, as if entrepreneurs
would not otherwise have invested; it is occasioned by and

makes visible a structural requirement of the signified, the requirement of a limited economic risk "as between the parties."
Similarly, instrumentalist propositions like "formal rules
foster predictability" collapse into tautologies if we see legal and
economic processes as a synthetic unity. Under atomic-substitu-

tional conditions, formal reasoning rationalizes atomic-substitutional effects.38 In legal discourse, these effects are signified as
the pre-dictable outcome of the reasoning to which they have
given rise. Under cluster-cooperative conditions, which call for
"moral behavior," standards and principles rationalize clustercooperative effects. This "informal" reasoning is no more or
less predictable than formal logic; it is simply the linguistic form
of cluster-cooperation, and so the modern businessman who has
interiorized a cooperative structure as "common sense" is quite
able to incorporate standards like "trade usage" within his expectation."
To take the contrary view is to break history into
pieces that can be put together only by an appeal to magic.
35. 9 Ex. 341, 156 Eng. Rep. 145 (1854). The case is often identified
as announcing the modern rule of general expectation damages, and as
limiting liability for consequential or "special" damages to those foreseeable at the time of formation. For a discussion of the pre-Hadley damage cases and their relationship to the development of markets in the
early part of the nineteenth century, see Horwitz, supra note 31, at 93652.
36. By "effects" I mean conditioned actions, which, taken as a whole,
form a behavioral structure. See also ALTHussm &

BAL

AR,

supra note

23, at 189.
37. What we call confusion assures the Hindu of what is to come.
Thus an English writer describes the "muddle" of a Hindu temple:
"'Tukaram, Tukaram,
Thou art my father and mother and everybody.
Tukaram, Tukaram,
Thou art my father and mother and everybody.
Tukaram, Tukaram. .. '
They sang not even to the God who confronted them, but to a
saint; they did not one thing which the non-Hindu would feel
dramatically correct; this approaching triumph of India was a
muddle (as we call it), a frustration of reason end form. Where
was the God Himself, in whose honor the congregation had
gathered? Indistinguishable in the jumble of His own altar,
huddled out of sight amid images of inferior descent, smothered
under rose-leaves, overhung by oleographs, out-blazed by golden
tablets representing the Rajah's ancestors, and entirely ob-

MINNESOTA LAW REVIEW

[Vol. 61:601

But perhaps I should stop here and admit to the apparent
appeals to magic of which I have been guilty in the account
given thus far. To speak of a "fusion of intention and structure" which culminates in the reasoning of a signifier is hardly to
comprehend the human activity of legal interpretation, because
there is no indication of how the structure "gets in"--that is, of
how a schematic appearance (the relation of signifier to signified) is to be made dialectically intelligible as the meaningful
activity of a temporal praxis. As I have said, the purpose of a
structural analysis is to make sense of a unified process as it
appears "from the outside." The ontology of this inside-outside
requires a phenomenological description, of the being of legal
interpretation as the inert structures of worked matter move
back and through its shape.
III. MEANING:

THE PRAXIS OF ALIENATED INTERPRETATION

If reason takes its form from the reflexive influence of
worked matter upon the significations of human actors, how
then are these signs also intended by their makers, or how can
the sign be both given and constructed at the same time? This
difficulty is resolvable if it is remembered that "intentionality" is
being used in the sense given to the term by phenomenologythat is, as an inherent existential, as a "quality" which is constitutive of consciousness. For readers not familiar with the phenomenological tradition in philosophy, this idea can be illustrated
by a well-known example from Gestalt psychology:

scured, when the wind blew, by the tattered foliage of a banana.

Hundreds of electric lights had been lit in His honor (worked

by an engine whose thumps destroyed the rhythm of the hymn).
Yet His face could not be seen. Hundreds of His silver dishes
were piled around Him with a minimum of effect. The inscriptions which the poets of the State had composed were hung
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In looking at this drawing, one can see either a vase or two faces
or perhaps even an inaccurate map of Kentucky turned sideways, but it "is" none of these "in reality." The constitution of
the image as meaningful in one or the other of these ways is
inherently intended, results from an a priori intentional orientation on the part of the perceiver. References to "epistemological
compulsion" in the previous section, therefore, are not to be
understood as meaning that the intentions of the knower are
somehow cancelled out, but rather that they are given a definite
structural form by material conditions. When "the facts" of
Norrington or Helgar are given form in the reflective acts of the
presiding judges, they are at the same time intentionally constituted so as to appear in this way rather than that, and yet that
appearance is conditioned by historicity. This is to say that
legal interpretation is meaningful because it is lived, even though
its particular form is overdetermined.
These observations draw us immediately to ontological
questions, for if this interpretation is lived, if it has a meaning
for being-in-the-world rather than being simply a still-life photo
which is plopped into consciousness, then the meaning for the
legal actor must be elaborated and, if possible, made explicit.
This is an effort of real difficulty because just as the sign in common sense points toward a signified outside of itself, so the intention that fashions the sign points toward a meaning inside itself,
a meaning that is not immediately intelligible even though it inherently makes sense. To say that a few days' delay in paying for
films is "not a material breach" makes sense to the twentiethcentury legal mind, but the phenomenology of this feeling of
making-sense is by no means self-evident. How is it, for example, that consciousness decides to interpret, and what is the
meaning for consciousness of interpretation as a mode of consciousness? Is interpretation praxis, or in other words, does
interpretive-being-in-the-world find its meaning as a mode of
action-in-the-world? And if interpretation is social activity
rather than merely private thoughts in the head, is the mode of
where they could not be read, or had twitched their drawingpins out of the stucco, and one of them (composed in English
to indicate His universality) consisted, by an unfortunate slip
of the draftsman, of the words,
"God si Love."

"God si Love."

Is this the first message of India?

M M. FORSTER, A PASSAGE

TO INDiA

284-85 (1924).
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interpretation coincident with the mode of social inter-experience?
Heidegger provided a groundwork for this inquiry in his
phenomenological description of interpretation,38 a detailed, precise account of how consciousness reveals itself to itself when
it adopts the interpretive mode of being-in-the-world. Utilizing
Husserl's method of phenomenological reduction, he works toward elucidating the meanings of conscious acts by an intuition
that "goes alongside" the intention and permits an explicit revelation of the meaning the intention discloses.3 9 Because consciousness intends the world interpretively when it interprets,
interpretation has an immanent meaning that is constitutive of
the intention, that is "in" the intention. Suppose I see a vase in
that drawing: it is not simply "that it is a vase as opposed to
two faces" which is meaningful, but also "that I am perceiving
rather than interpreting what I perceive." And as I write these
words there is a meaning to the fact that I am now interpreting
my perception, letting the original vase-perception or perhaps
"vase-ness" be seen as a vase when I say to myself "that is
a vase." The perception and the interpretation each have immanent meaning; each is constituted by its own intentionality, and
in each case the meaning of the intention is understood by
consciousness and is disclosed to the reductive intuition.
The word "understanding," however, has a meaning for
Heidegger different from its ordinary usage. Understanding
(verstehen) does not describe something that happens after the
conscious act in the sense of "I understand why I did that"; that
usage is more properly restricted to what Heidegger would call
"interpretation" and has an explicitly reflexive character. Understanding is rather constitutive of meaning and immanent to
it, an irreducible existential which is, in a way, the being of
knowledge.40 In philosophical language, consciousness is an
See HEIDEGGER, supra note 4, at 188-203.
39. Husserl referred to this "going alongside" as the "epoche" (from
the Greek "epokhe," meaning abstention). In the epoche consciousness
38.

brackets its immediate responses so as to describe not simply "the world"
as if it were "simply there" as a natural phenomenon, but the world
as constituted by consciousness-in-the-world. See E. HussmL, IDFAs 9699 (1962).
40. Heidegger argues that all theory, even the most abstract mathematical physics, has its ground in the understanding of a praxis. This
is so because before a theory can give an account of any "facts" at all,
that which is made a fact must be thematized according to some understood meaning of the data for consciousness. For a discussion of his "existential conception of science," see HEmwGER, supra note 4, at 408-15.
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entity whose being is such that it understands the meaning which
it intends, or which it projects "onto" its world.
Interpretation is the "working out of possibilities projected
in understanding," 4' 1 permitting meaning to come explicitly into
sight, and permitting understanding to be appropriated by consciousness. The ontological structure of interpretation takes the
form of "something-as-something," by which is meant that interpretation, in making that which is understood stand out explicitly, gives meaning the modification of "as-itself." The perception of "vase" and the interpretation "that is a vase" are
temporally discrete conscious acts, and the latter arises when my
intention is to allow the perception to be known explicitly. In
an ontological sense, therefore, interpretation is not analytical;
what is understood is not "figured out" but recognized:
In interpreting, we do not, so to speak, throw a 'signification'
over some naked thing which is present-at-hand, we do not stick
a value on it; but when something within-the-world is encountered as such, the thing in question already has an involvement
which is disclosed in our understanding of the world, and42this
involvement is one which gets laid out by the interpretation.
Understanding and interpretation, then, are modes of being
which disclose meaning.
But before moving on to a phenomenology of legal interpretation in an effort to say something about its meaning, the
relationship of understanding and interpretation to meaning
needs further clarification. Suppose that as I walk into this
room, I notice a vase. What does Heidegger mean when he says
this vase "already has an involvement" which is understood?
One way of getting at his meaning is to realize how unlikely it
would be for me to notice the vase as a mere object, or as
Heidegger puts it, as a "naked thing," and for me to then say to
myself "that is a vase." If I were a scientist whose academic
interest were in the properties of vases, then understanding the
vase as a "naked thing" might not be quite so peculiar because I
would naturally have an intention to see it that way. But as I
am not a vase-scientist, my noticing the vase would likely have a
very different meaning-namely, as toward something other than
an objective analysis of its properties. Perhaps the "involvement" of the vase with my meaning would be toward "something possible to do with flowers," perhaps toward some possible
mastery of a vase-related childhood memory, perhaps almost
41. Id. at 189.
42. Id. at 190-91.
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anything. But whatever the meaning that calls out the involvement, it must have the ontological structure of "toward"-that
is, of pcissibility rather than fact. When the scientist has his
attention drawn to the vase as a "naked thing," this fact-perception of his attentiveness is not its meaning, for the meaning is a
toward-analysis. And we might even say that to perceive the
vase as a naked thing does a certain violence to its "vaseness,"
neutralizing the available meanings of what one might call the
possible vase. A vase so perceived is in a certain sense no
longer a vase.
Returning to the drawing of the vase or two faces, we can
now say a bit more about what it means to perceive "vase" and
to say "that is a vase," perhaps as a way toward understanding
more about the meaning of "that is failure of condition" or "that
is material breach." For the involvement of these lines on paper
I call a drawing emerges as already situated toward a meaningthat is, toward figuring out what things can be identified there as
objects-and when I perceive "vase" and interpret "that is a
vase," I am no longer aware of the meaning this activity has for
me. When interpretation presents the world as fact, it has
severed itself from understood meaning. This is not to say that
the situated meaning is no longer, but rather that I am no longer
aware of the meaning it has for me. Heidegger calls this
"assertion"-an empiricist modification of ontological interpretation that seeks to say something definite about the world,
precluding consciousness from interpreting the meaning it understands. "When we merely stare at something, our just-having-it-before-us lies before us as a failure to understand it any
43
more."
For Heidegger, the tendency of consciousness to conceal
understanding by restructuring its experience of the world into
fact-interpretations is itself an ontological tendency: consciousness tends to flee from authentic knowledge and to fall into the
4
inauthentic fact-thinking of what he calls the "They-world""
because of ontological anxiety brought about by the contingency
of authentic understanding, its merely-possible quality. Under
the strain of the contingency that haunts being-in-the-world
43. Id. at 190.

44. Id. at 163-68. In "the They," "everyone is the other, and no one
is himself." Id. at 165. The They speaks "idle talk" Id. at 211. More

obvious manifestations are disclosed at cocktail parties and on the evening news, although for Heidegger this falling into the They is an ontological condition rather than a disparagement.
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(variously described by other existential phenomenologists as
"dread," "angst," "nausea," etc.), consciousness tends to engage
in self-deception, splitting cognition from authentic knowledge
and re-presenting its world to itself as a reification, an atemporal
object. 45 But this false consciousness, or more accurately, false
interpretation, contains its own intentionality, the intention being
precisely not to be aware of what is understood, to repress
understanding beneath a reassuring image of externally related
facts. To recall the legal-theorist-in-reflection whose ruminations began this essay, whether positivist or naturalist he makes
of the law an object, replete with sovereigns, guideposts, and so
forth, in order not to be thrown back upon the very insubstantiality of what he is talking about-namely, interpretive activity.
The law does not exist, and his uneasy knowledge of this state of
affairs moves him toward a reaction-formation, an affirmation
in cognition of precisely the opposite of what he knows ontologically. So also the lawyer who intends his client's story
into that contradiction in terms, a "fact-situation," and then
proceeds to analyze its properties (failure of condition, material
breach), as if.
And yet we have already seen that legal interpretation
always takes a definite social form. While Heidegger would
find all such interpretation inauthentic from the viewpoint of an
idealist phenomenology, the use of the term "inauthentic" must
be integrated with the explicitly social structure of the legal signsystem. When consciousness interprets legally, it is not simply
lost in a random "They"; it totalizes a concrete historical situation. The question is, what is the relationship between factinterpretation and the situated social existence of economic actors who are, so to speak, fact-interpreted? A one-sentence
answer which in a way synthesizes the positions of Heidegger and
Marx 46 might read as follows: To give a fact-interpretation of
45. This is a formulation of Sartre's early concept of "bad faith."

See BEiNG Am NOTHINGNESS, supra note 4, at 56-86. To the extent that

it implies a choice made by a radically free subjectivity, it is no longer
his view. His movement toward an existential Marxism has also involved a reconciliation with Freudianism, at least to the extent that he
accepts the idea of an unconscious. For a description of this reconciliation, see JAMESON, supra note 1, at 214-19. Sartre compares Freud's
view of the unconscious with his own in an interview in which he suggests that "the unconscious" is not an entity, but a dialectical process
within which "consciousness plays the trick of determining itself by forgetfulness." 58 NEw LEFT REviEw 43, 48 (1969). This seems to me quite
close to Heidegger's idea of the understanding, except that the "trick"
is existential-deterministic rather than merely existential.
46. I am referring to Marx's description of commodity fetishism, in
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a human relationship is to describe a relation between persons as
a relation between things, and the ontological meaning of such
an interpretation is to conceal that persons are not things. But
such an answer seems unacceptable, for how is it that persons
appear and are ready to be seen as thing-like at the same time
that they understand that they are not things?
Sartre's later work has been an effort to close the gap
between an existential idealism that elaborates meanings from
the sole viewpoint of a subjective being, and a positivist Marxism
that makes persons objects in a wholly objective dialectic. For
our purposes his descriptions help to make intelligible the fusion
of intention and structure in legal discourse. In The Critique of
DialecticalReason, 4 7 he has tried to show that the starting point
for ontology is social existence, and that social existence is
revealed as mediated reciprocities within which there are no pure
subjects as such, but groupings in which persons act and are
conditioned. The idea of reciprocity has its origin in the Hegelian concept of recognition: human beings are such that they
come to recognize themselves as social through an immanent
awareness of being recognized by others. 48 This reciprocity of
which he describes the commodity as a '"mysterious thing" that produces
"a definite social relation between men that assumes, in their eyes, the
fantastic form of a relation between things." 1 K. MAnx, CAPrAL, 72
(New World paperback ed. 1967).
47. See note 1 supra.
48. See G. HEGEL, PEMNONENOLOGY OF MIM (1967) (especially the
famous chapter on lordship and bondage which begins, "Self-consciousness exists in itself and for itself, in that, and by the fact that it exists
for another self-consciousness; that is to say, it is only by being acknowledged or 'recognized."' Id. at 229.) Sartre writes that for Hegel, "the
appearance of the Other is indispensible .

.

. to the very existence of

my consciousness as self-consciousness," and "as self-consciousness the
Self itself apprehends itself." BEING AND NOTnimGNEsS, supra note 4, at
319. Put more simply, before I can be conscious of myself as a person

in the ordinary sense, I must have had the experience of being recognized

as such by someone else. Therefore, to recognize myself as myself is
to be already a social being. Thus there are no such beings as "individuals" if that term means "separate persons" who are also human.
The psychiatrist Harry Stack Sullivan has based an entire theory of

psychology on this idea, although without reference to Hegel or later

existential phenomenologists. His theory is in essence that the child interiorizes the recognition provided by his family in the development of
what Sullivan calls the "self-system!' The one whom the parents recognize as their child is interiorized by the child as "good-me." With the
development of language the child comes to signify "good-me" as ',"
in varying degrees dissociating experience which is not recognized as
"him" in his social world. These dissociations are structured as "notme," a concept which presents the Freudian unconscious in a social lan-
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recognitions was a central theme of Sartre's early work,49 but

had the weakness of reducing social existence to a two-person
encounter. In the idea of "mediation" which emerges in the
Critique, he has been able to link reciprocal recognitions to the
group, discovering that the reciprocities that constitute our experience as social are mediated by a "third" whose presence may be
felt as an actual third person, as an institution, or most relevantly
from our point of view, as a sort of inhabitant of worked
matter.50
At first this must strike us as odd. Perhaps we can grasp
the ontological significance of an actual third person (as in the
lawyers' interior relation to each other before a judge), or that of
an institution (as in the interior relation of two students within a
law school), but inhabitants of matter? The difficulty of this
idea is alleviated, however, if we remember that worked matter
is not lived as the uninhabitable and massive in-itself unveiled by
the natural sciences, but as a sign that traces a past and points
toward a future. As such it is structured like a language, whose
rules we know as a past as we use them to signify our possibilities. Worked matter is inhabited by neither God nor Soul, but
by an Other who is our history.
So it is the machine, to take a Sartrean example, which
establishes the reciprocity of the workers, not as a hypothetical
Metal Thing with hypothetically infinite possibilities for use, but
as an historical sign that materializes a general destiny for the
guage. See H. SuLLEVAx, THE INTERPERSONAL THEORY OF PSYCHIATRY
(1953).
Although Sullivan's social theory has been justly criticized as a conservative and normative ego-psychology by writers like Marcuse, see
H. MARCUSE, ERos Am CIVIIZATzION 238-74 (1969), I think his perceptions provide a basis for a genuinely radical psychology, particularly as
his work has been integrated with an analysis of the family as a group
by R.D. Laing. See, e.g., P. LAING, THE PoLmcs OF THE FAMILY (1969),
and R. LAING & A. ESTERsO N, SAwmr, MADNESs, Am TuE FAMLmm (1964).

For a work that tries to show the influence of Sullivan and Sartre on
Laing's thought, see E. FREDENBERii, R.D. LAING (1974).
49. See BEING AND NOTHiNGNESS, supra note 4 (especially the chap-

ter entitled Concrete Relations with Others, at 471-553). Here human relations are described as an ontological conflict: each person's recognition
of the other is inherently alienating because it makes of the other an
object, negating the other's freedom. The result is an endless struggle
of subjectivities; each seeking to recover the freedom snatched away by
the other through reciprocal objectifications.
50. See the section entitled Duality and the Third Partyin CRTQuE,
supra note 1, at 100-09. Sartre's description of the exigency brought

about by the relation of "need" to "scarcity" is omitted here and can
be found id. at 79-94 (need) and 122-52 (scarcity).
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workers who must manipulate it as a collective but dispersed
activity. As both a collective "social memory" 51 (for the sign
was shaped teleologically by another's past labor) and as an
exigent common future (for it must be used in a certain way for
production and subsistence), the machine mediates not only the
objective functioning of the workers but their concrete recognition of each other as grouped beings. Thus the machine speaks
word, as "a
to persons and orders them in both senses of the
52
parasitic inertia which vampirizes human action.1
Material forces gathered together in the passive unity of tools
or machines perform actions; they unify other inorganic dispersals and thereby impose a material unification on the plurality
of men. The movement of materiality, in fact, derives from
men. But the praxis inscribed in the instrument by past labour
defines behavior a priori by sketching in its passive rigidity the
outline of a sort of mechanical alterity (otherness). Precisely
because matter mediates between men, men mediate between
materialized praxes, and dispersal orders itself into a sort of
quasi-synthetic hierarchy reproducing the particular ordering
imposed on materiality by past labour in the form of a human
order. 58

If we return to the facts of Helgar but include within these
"facts" the film as a sign of what the parties must do, we can see
more easily how the parties appear to each other as thing-like
within a mediated reciprocity. For the situated film appears to
its seller and its buyer as pointing toward its consumption in "the
market," and so it orders the seller to recognize the buyer as a
buyer, and orders the buyer to recognize the seller as a seller. In
seeing the other as his reciprocal function-as "seller" or "buyer" under conditions of necessity-each recognizes the other
precisely as Other, that is, as other than himself, as bathed in a
functional "outside." And since each interiorizes the other's
mediated recognition as a quasi-objective role or "self-image",
each is to himself as the other sees him-that is, as other to the
other and as other to himself."4 Crushed into passivity by the
51. Id. at 184.
52. Id.
53. Id. (parentheses added).
54. See also Heidegger's description of "the They," note 44 supra,
and compare these words of the psychiatrist R.D. Laing:
Gossip and scandal are always and everywhere elsewhere. Each
person is the other to the others....
Now the peculiar thing about Them is that They are created
only by each one of us repudiating his own identity. When we
have installed Them in our hearts, we are only a plurality of
solitudes in which what each person has in common is his allocation to the other of the necessity for his own actions. Each
person, however, as other to the other, is the other's necessity.
Each denies any internal bond with the others; each person
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signifying inertia of the film as worked matter, "seller" and
"buyer" struggle as a twosome in a reciprocal solitude, not as
"individuals", but as bonded in solitude within a milieu which
makes of their relatedness an alienated series, a "one-and-one"
of solitary antagonism mediated by matter. In their very being
they exist together in mutual recognition, but it is no longer a
matter of abstract "subjects" who objectify each other: they are
grouped and given their divisively joined existence by a "third"
embedded in the inorganic sign. It is the practical ensemble of
all such mediated reciprocities, each mediating other reciprocities, that comprises the totality and situates human action in a
social world.
What is exciting about Sartre's description of the ontology
of groups is that it offers a path from the brute language of
traditional Marxism-a language of economic functions in
which alienation is an hypostasized and slightly mystical outcome
of the capitalist division of labor-to a language of existential
Marxism in which alienation is temporalized as a living objectivity, an outside-of-itself-toward of the group in action. The
multiple reifications of inert collectivities, these "one-and-one"
arrangements of reciprocal solitudes which Sartre calls a "series" 55 and which characterize social life under modern conditions, are not alienated as a factual inertia like pure matter ( in
which case persons would be things and could not be "alien"),
but are meaningfully alienated toward a social existence which
would not be other-than-itself-toward but the same-as-itselftoward. And this is not a romantic fantasy of an end-state in
perfect repose. The existential experience of an alienness in
which each is experienced as other to the other and other to
himself is made possible only by its negative project: a moment in which "each person continues to see himself in the
Other, but sees himself there as himself." 56
claims his own inessentiality... Yet although I can make no

difference, I cannot act differently. No single other person is
any more necessary to me than I claim to be to Them. But just
as he is "one of Them" to me, so I am "one of Them" to him.
In this collection of reciprocal indifference, of reciprocal inessentiality and solitude, there appears to exist no freedom. There
is conformity to a presence that is everywhere elsewhere.
R. LAING, TnE PoLimcs oF Exrpmucn 81, 83-84 (1968).
55. For Sartre's description of the series as a generality, see CnrrIQuE, supra note 1, at 256-59. For his discussion of the mediated reciprocities which make up "the market," see the section entitled Impotence
as a bond: the free market, id. at 277-93.
56. This is the translation of S. & J. Atkinson in THE PnmosoPHY
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Under conditions that bring about inert rather than organic
social arrangements, the law is not inauthentic interpretation,
but alienated. interpretation. It is not "lost in the They," but descriptive of a structured, situated ontological relation-an alienated reciprocity-that wishes to signify itself as a legal relation.
The mode of interpretation that will re-present "the parties" to
themselves as they in fact are in their real social activity together
is one that makes assertions about them (in Heidegger's
sense)-that is, that re-presents their quasi-objective reciprocity
as a reciprocity of fact-entities, linked atomic-substitutionally or
cluster-cooperatively. And yet they are not really facts, not
really things because each has interiorized intentionally (in the
phenomenological sense) the role each has assumed. So also
the judge does not really see facts or things, a thing herself. The
signs do not come tumbling out of her being like quarters from a
slot-machine. Her interpretation is resorted to as the voice of
her own interiorized and mediated role, and its intention is to
conceal beneath the causal reasoning of analytical thought, with
attendant rules, principles, and so forth, an understood social
schism too painful to be made explicit. Her interpretation can
be called alienated only because it is both praxis and process,
intention and structure, meaning and form: it is a conspiracy
of a collective understanding against itself.
Here, then, is a glimmer of how an "outside" form, made
intelligible by a structural-analytic method, and an interior
meaning, made intelligible by a phenomenological method, are
fused dialectically in the interpretive act. Legal structures have
their intelligibility "outside" precisely because they work back
and through us as an Other who haunts our social being, who
allows us to be recognized only as other than ourselves. As our
intentions rise up to deceive us, we see facts that we know are
not facts, repeating a struggle that is repeatedly dispersed in an
JaEA -PAuL SARim 467 (R. Cumming ed. 1965).
A slightly different
wording is given in CRmQuE, supra note 1, at 354.
The sense of this negative project is not grasped by the image of
one individual somehow "seeing himself" in the Other, but rather by
calling up the experience of "we" in the face of a mortal threat. Sartre
calls this "we" a "fused-group," id. at 345-404. The "fused-group" is in
no sense a utopian end of history, and Sartre follows out all of the ossifications against which the group must continue to struggle. One of the
few moments of our current daily life which seems to me to evoke the
sense of a fused "we" is the phenomenon of spontaneous applause, where
each discovers the meaning of her own act in the act of the other person.
For an interesting comparison, see Roberto Unger's theory of "organic groups" in UNGER, supra note 24, at 236-95, and also the description
of principles of altruism in Kennedy, supra note 17, at 1771-76.

oF
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inertia. Thus we signify ourselves as who we in fact are, and
are not.
IV. CONCRETE APPEARANCES OF LAW:
AN

ImPLICIT
EXPLICIT LEGAL INTERPRETATION

To summarize: a praxis is a practicing consciousness that
interiorizes its phenomenal world as a conditioning and yet
surpasses it as a temporal project. This conditioning is an
alienating process within which worked matter gives rise to
social arrangements that cut us off from one another, and from
ourselves. The experience of being cut-off is ontological; it is
the experience of a social being who is recognized as Other, and
who therefore recognizes herself as Other. The mode of interpretation which intentionally signifies such a social arrangement
is a fact-interpretation that conceals an understood alienation.
Fact-interpretation produces legal signs structured according to
organizing principles that correspond to the organizing principles of the signified structure-that is, the relational work-forms
that constitute the social structure of worked matter itself. And
yet as a temporal project that understands what it cannot interpret, legal praxis struggles against itself.
But the concrete existence of legal interpretation is revealed
only in the moments of its appearance. If this essay is really to
be an "outline of a method," at least brief attention must be
given to law as it suddenly comes into the world. Although it
would be too much to attempt a phenomenology of every instance of legal interpretation (in court, out of court, in the
classrooms, families, law books, and so forth), we can detect two
dialectically related phases of its appearance: first, the production of an implicitly legal sign in language as a response to
anxiety about disclosure of a concealed understanding (in psychoanalytic language one could speak of the "return of the
repressed"); second, the ritualized explication or making-explicit that occurs largely, at least in the case of contract law, in the
judicial opinion which "systematizes" the sign in a doctrinal
language. I call the first phase "implicitly legal" not because it
is any less legal from the ontological-interpretive point of view,
but only because we do not ordinarily think of its activity as lawmaking. Also, I use the terms "first and second phases" only
for convenience and do not wish to imply some sort of causal
sequence. Dialectical reason does not admit of causal descriptions in which factors stand apart from and influence each other
in a this-then-that fashion, partes extra partes; rather, these
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phases are to be grasped as constituents of living form which are
elaborated within the movement of a social totality.
In the first or more implicit mode legal interpretation is
resorted to as a particular way of allowing a difficult situation to
be seen. Let me give a rather elaborate example of this in order
to get at it from the ground up. I am working at a table in a coffee house. Across from me is a woman. Each of us has a cup of
coffee, and there are sugar cubes in a bowl. As I am engaged nonreflectively in a series of acts designed to get coffee of a particular sweetness into my body, all the while intending toward a particular foreseen satisfaction, I reach for a sugar cube, and at a certain point in the reach, a particular cube begins to be understood
as "mine" in a dim sense because of its gradual implication with
what I have come to know as my body and its satisfactions. Then,
"too late" in light of prevailing social meanings, the woman
quickly reaches out and grabs that cube, and suddenly, before a
word has been spoken, interpretation erupts into this minor
drama-in fact lets the drama be known as drama. In the ensuing
discussion, or if there is no discussion, in the exchange of
glances, the sugar cube will be re-presented to consciousness as
an object, a naked thing that calls out assertions about its "social
properties"-that is, is it "mine" or "hers" or still "the restaurant's"? Certainly the law of property, probably of contracts,
and perhaps also of torts and crimes have allowed themselves to
be shown, but in a rather implicit mode. The language used is
not what we would ordinarily consider "legal," but the exchange
of words or glances has recourse in its very structure to "the
law": we are "doing interpretation" to our relationship in a
way that re-establishes our alienated inter-experience by reference to an abstract, reified set of facts about the sugar cube, and
that does so along lines that are called out ultimately by the
global structure of the historical situation within which we are
thrown.
What are these "lines," and in what way do they call out
an interpretation that re-establishes an alienated inter-experience? In socio-economic language, the scarcity of the sugar
cube has established competitive relations of consumption, 57 and
therefore she and I as "us" have a serialized relatedness-that is,
57. The cube is not objectively scarce if there are other cubes in the
bowl. But she and I are not being "objective" about whether there is
an abundance. The cube of our struggle is already a sign in a world
of scarcity and competition, and so we experience it in our conditioning
as a limited sweetness.
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as a dyad we are "individualized" into passivity by the cube, and
in this sense, scarcity impels an alienation, or the social structure
of matter calls out a schismatic relation. In social-psychological
language, the experience of intrusion, or violation of the "mineboundary," engenders an anxiety which calls out assertive interpretation as a defense of my role, experienced subjectively as a
defense of what I conceive to be "me." In social-phenomenological language, the meaning of the shift into fact-interpretation
about the sugar cube is precisely towards concealment of an
understood "unconscious" frustration-the frustration of the social division brought about by the force of processed matter
upon our inter-experience-and this "shift" is meaningful praxis
by virtue of its intentionality. She and I make the cube-asobject in order to be painfully reassured by the ratio decidendi
that emerges from our interpretive logic. While the signs we
use, whether linguistic or gestural, have reference to a structure
of which we know next to nothing, our activity in producing
them has an ontological meaning, an intentional failure to understand.
In the same fashion the parties in what will later become
Helgar Corp. v. Warner's Features,Inc. resort to implicitly legal
interpretation when they approach the bargaining table with the
intention of making a contract-that is, with the intention of
doing interpretation to their relationship in a way that comforts
it in abstract assertions. Contrary to what "common sense"
would indicate, these parties are not simply planning their possible economic relationship, allocating rights and duties and the
like, any more than the waiter who sashays up to my table with a
tray barely balanced on an upturned wrist is "really" just serving
food and drink to customers. The actual economic relationship
involving the sale and distribution of moving pictures is in fact
reified by the economic structure, which works back and
-through "the parties" as a process. Their praxis is the engaging
of this situation with its social meaning for them, which they
accomplish in part at the bargaining table by this mystification
we are calling "doing interpretation." Unlike in the sugar cube
situation, however, the parties are gathered not for the purpose
of interpreting the "what happened," but rather to interpret the
"what will happen," a formal distinction without ontological
significance. In the concrete moment as the parties and their
lawyers look each other in the eye preparing to haggle over
terms and so forth, the ontological objective remains to put this
present temporal moment into an abstract order, in which one
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object, the abstract party-of-the-first-part, is to be possessed of
certain rights, and the other objective party-of-the-second-part is
to be burdened with certain duties, and then vice-versa, until a
piece of paper with writing on it is signed by two living people
who can now feel a certain relief that the "what will happen"
has been given a certain substance. Whatever language we use
to describe the reason for this resort to fact-interpretation (socio-economic, social-psychological, or social-phenomenological),
can we not simply say that the lawyers now know that they
are lawyers, and the parties now know that they are parties?This
chaotic group event has been charmed into submission to the
structure of matter which dominates it by an ideological activity
which has concealed alienated reciprocity in a thing: The contract. They have all gotten together and "made law."
When I say this first phase is characterized by the production of a legal sign, I mean only that the abstract order given in
this contract is accomplished by the use of language that makes
visible as an "outside" the prevailing tendency in the structure of
matter. Between the making of the Norrington rail contract and
the making of the Helgar film contract, there will have occurred
a certain reconfiguring of the shape of language that lines up the
"talk" according to the transformation of the situation, or structure. The call the Helgar film makes upon the human beings
who are to process it will not be the same as that of the Norrington rails, and the signs used to allow the change to appear will
suffer a dialectical modification analogous to the movement
noted earlier from positivism to normism in legal theory. Although a linguistic-structural analysis of this kind cannot be
managed here (recovering the documents themselves would be
a difficult task), its accomplishment would be of value in showing the synchronic relation between signs in the implicit and
explicit modes-between, say, the Helgar contract and Cardozo's later opinion. Yet here again we must emphasize that
these signs are not "all there is." They are revelatory of the
inertial movement of the structure, but they are made by living
human consciousness in a practical struggle against its own
oppression by matter even as the sign itself permits that oppression to come into existence. These lawyers, these parties, are
doing something socially meaningful-namely, this activity of
alienated interpretation-which is revealed as such phenomenologically and cannot be flattened out into the noises of a mechanism.
This first appearance of law, then, arises in a sphere that is
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not ordinarily the object of legal theory as such, as that discipline focuses itself ordinarily on the formal juridicial act taken,
in Heidegger's phrase, as present-at-hand, or in its ideal form. 58
Yet this first phase must of necessity be included in a dialectical
legal theory because without its elucidation, the juridical act (the
judicial opinion, the statute, the constitution, etc.) remains an
extemporized dropping of some isolated person or group that
has reference only to other like acts, and with "changing mores"
or something similar thrown in as the deus ex machina, the wind
of change. Once the first phase is shown in its structural and
ontological dimensions, however, the second or explicit phase
comes more easily into view as a concrete, intelligible movement
in the totality.
As a way of approaching the ontological and structural
dimensions of the second phase, let us imagine that instead of
producing an opinion after due deliberation, Cardozo and his
colleagues on the court of appeals simply voted on the outcome of Helgarby secret ballot on the bench. No briefs, no oral
argument, no conference; just "Judgment for the -"
whispered to an official charged with seeing to the details of execution. The result would no doubt be the same, if not in this case
then soon in a similar case, because the outcome of litigation
must "contain" the form of the relations of production however
the exigencies of interpretation are worked out. Yet this result
would come into the world as an absurdity, a hemorrage in the
spectacle. From a phenomenological point of view, existential
58. The phrase "present-at-hand" describes the way that something
appears phenomenologically to the natural-science outlook. Heidegger

contrasts the "present-at-hand" with the "ready-to-hand," which describes the referential character of something as a sign. Thus a typically

Heideggerian passage reads as follows:
What gets taken as a sign becomes accessible only through its
readiness-to-hand. If, for instance, the south wind "is accepted"

by the farmer as a sign of rain, then this "acceptance"--or the
"value" with which the entity is "invested"-is not a sort of
bonus over and above what is already present-at-hand in itselfviz, the flow of air in a definite geographical direction. The
south wind may be meteorologically accessible as something
which just occurs; but it is never present-at-hand proximally in
such a way as this, only occasionally taking over the function
of a warning signal. On the contrary, only by the circumspection with which one takes account of things in farming is the
south wind discovered in its Being.
HEMEGGER, supra note 4, at 111-12. See also J. GABEL, FALSE CONSCIOUSNrss: AN ESSAY IN RE ICATION 109-10 (1975), in which the author describes what I am calling explicit law as a spatialized, atemporal, and
therefore non-dialectical thought (which he calls a species of "justificatory reasoning").
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consciousness would have been deprived of its way of grasping
the "what happened," and the disclosure permitted by such a
break would show itself in the forms of outrage. The words "who
do these guys think they are" would signify precisely that these
other persons, suddenly decorated in rather odd robes of some
sort and sitting at a rather peculiar and elevated distance from
the rest, were not being judges.
What these judges would have done is to have abandoned
the ideological form within which their real social activity is
allowed to happen, and in a way that permits us to see the
ideological form in some detail. As I have suggested, the
economic structure in a certain sense dictates what they must say
(the rules, principles, and so forth), but how it is to be said is
worked through a living milieu. Here we find the trappings of a
ritual, a due process of the sort that has always been required for
the sanctification of signs, and each variation must weaken the
uniquely legal hum of the ultimate verbal product, the opinion
itself. "There will be no assumption of a purpose to visit venial
faults with oppressive retribution," 59 acquires a different ring if
it falls from the mouth of a bystander. The ritual is therefore a
central element of the law made explicit as law in that it gives to
the sign its axiomatic valence. Alienated consciousness must
know "that was the law" in precisely the same sense and with the
same degree of awe as "that was the Lone Ranger."
This ritual is elaborated within the actual opinion where the
law is made explicit as law by the device of doctrine and the
inexorability of the reason which forms it. This is accomplished
by a living judge engaged in the practical task of reestablishing
(and, of course, struggling against) the alienated situation within which he finds himself, through a process of abstract systemization. If the judge is to make assertions about the world-here
this relationship between HIelgar and Warner-he must first
represent the world to himself in a way that permits this to
occur, since asserting is a mode of interpretation that requires its
world to be given "objectively" as a reification. Systemization occurs therefore as an abstracting away in the imagination, calling
forth "the parties" and so forth as particles within an imagined
ontic-empirical entity, an entity that derives its shape from the
tendency in the global economic structure given in everyday reflection as "common sense" (for example, in Helgar, unlike in
59. Jacob & Youngs, Inc. v. Kent, 230 N.Y. 239, 242, 129 N.E. 889,
891 (1921).

19771

INTENTION AND STRUCTURE

Norrington,a certain bonding between the parties will be given a
prioriin the intended image and will later be signified by the duty
to act in good faith). The call of this entity upon the judge who
has intentionally conceived it will be to identify certain "properties" and assert their presence or absence in legal languagecontract or no contract, breach or no breach-but not as simple
facts like the spots on a leopard, rather as facts asserted within
the teleological directional provided by the prevailing form of
reason itself. So the findings of "contract" and "minor breach"
in Helgar are fore-ordained to be plucked from an intended
image that holds particles bonded in "good faith."
As in the situation of the parties at the bargaining table
during the implicit phase, however, the judge's activity is not that
of a neon sign plugged into a hyperorganic materialism. For as
Cardozo bends over his manuscript (or that of his clerk), as he
abstracts away, as he intones his "new test" from the bench, and
as he retires to chambers-in short as he undertakes all of the
movements that are the trappings of his situation-he knows
himself as a judge, reproducing the alienation of being-judge
within the social conditions by which his role derives its collective significance. As the language structure makes visible the
economic structure, so the assertive mode of its utterance reveals
to phenomenology the ontological foundation of its appearance.
It is within the objective difficulty of lived judgeness, and the
objective linguistic forms at his disposal, that he must struggle to
be. When Cardozo hands down Helgar Corp. v. Warner's
Features,Inc., he performs a judicial function as a situated man,
a function that no doubt eludes his understanding in its structural significance, but of which he has concealed understanding
ontologically. It is in this ontological sense that legal realism
retains some validity; it is Cardozo who makes the doctrine of
material breach even if the words he speaks are not strictly
speaking his own.
In both the implicit and explicit phases, therefore, the use of
legal interpretation is a form of social action to which consciousness turns as a way of reestablishing a socially alienated role with
an economic referrent. Like the relation of the ego to the id in
psychoanalytic thought, the fact-interpretation keeps what Heidegger calls "understanding" unconscious. Yet like the relation
of the id to the ego, understanding struggles against the reified
sign-system imposed by its conditioning. This conflict is synthesized in the intended word.
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Can we say anything, then, about the two phases taken
together? Even if instrumentalism places a mistaken emphasis
on the objective importance of the legal outcome, attributing
a sort of substance to what is never more than interpretive
activity, can we at least say that the explicit opinion has some
impact on the implicit legal discourse at the bargaining table, or
in "society at large?" To the extent that we think of these
questions in causal terms, expecting the judicial opinion to
exercise some moral sway over what people do, how they perceive their situation, and so forth, I believe that the answer is no.
To think otherwise is to return to a kind of idealism, to "intend" the world as a kind of mechanical object and then to breathe
life into it. The explicit and the implicit move as one within the
collectivity of a social consciousness cut off from itself, and
requiring for its "fallenness" or concealment a structured discourse that provides the abstract reference point for its modelling of immediate existence. The explicit opinion, statute, whatever, serves only to make possible this modelling or ordering of
daily life in the implicit mode, not according to the content of
what is presented explicitly (for example, the legal characterization of "the contract," or the law of conditions), but by virtue of
its very existence irrespective of its content as a sort of pseudosubstantiality "out there." This is what is meant by describing
the totality of legal-interpretive activity, both implicit and
explicit at once, as "living form," of which each phase or valence
is a constituent.
The only objective impact of the opinion's language is
precisely in the realm of language itself, the only realm in which
the opinion actually has an objective existence as an historical
product. Here the opinion, produced as praxis, turns back in
time as an inert process, as its signs are instantly surpassed by
the dialectical movement of the structure itself-that is, by the
temporal transformation of the relations of production and the
straining praxis by which this relation is lived as socially meaningful. It is only in this sense that the language of the opinion
comes back as objectivity, as an objective resistance that serves
as the problematic ground against which the struggle to keep up
the facade is waged. This is to say that the alienated interpreting we call "law" is situated within the structurally shaped lifein-death, death-in-life crust of its past. In this final sense law
totalizes a collective struggle at the level of interpretation, a
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struggle between accumulated labor as structured process and
the laboring activity of human praxis.
So if we return to the movement from Norrington to
Helgar, we can now outline a method to guide our interpretation. First we must sketch out the organizing principles of the
economic structure (atomic-substitutional - cluster-cooperative), which permits us to observe the transforming significations
in legal discourse (failure of condition, or "no duty to act in
good faith" at the level of law itself; positivism, logical reason,
separation of law and morals at the level of jurisprudence ->
material breach, or "duty to act in good faith" at the level of law
itself; natural law, normative reason, reconvergence of law and
morals at the level of jurisprudence). This much gives an
analytical intelligibility to the objective legal situation. Second,
we must move inward to grasp the intentions of the legal actors
as they invigorate the situation with its social meaning-that is,
with what they actually experience while sipping coffee in a
restaurant, or bending over a fat book, or "sitting on the Supreme Court." Each movement in thought works toward the
reconstruction of an ordinary moment of human experience at
odds with itself.

